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COMMENT
MINNESOTA V. CARTER: THE TEMPORARY GUEST'S
REDUCED EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided that an overnight
guest was entitled to protection from unreasonable searches under the
Fourth Amendment.' Unresolved, however, was whether this protection
would extend to a temporary guest.2 In 1998, the Supreme Court exam-
ined this question in Minnesota v. Carter.' The Court applied the two-
prong Katz' test with special emphasis on the business nature of the tem-
porary guest's visit to conclude, "an overnight guest in a home may
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely
present with the consent of the householder may not."'
This Comment examines the history of the law leading up to Carter,
provides the facts of the case, and argues that the majority improperly
applied the widely followed two-prong Katz Fourth Amendment reason-
ableness test. The Court refused Fourth Amendment protection to tempo-
rary guests in part because it perceived that society recognizes the over-
night guest's expectation of privacy as more reasonable than the tempo-
rary guest's. This comparative analysis, however, steps over the para-
mount issue of whether society recognizes the temporary guest's expec-
tation of privacy as sufficiently reasonable to warrant Fourth Amend-
ment protection. Moreover, the Court acted shortsightedly in treating a
private residence used for occasional business transactions the same as a
traditional commercial property, despite the increasing commercial uses
of the private home. Finally, the Court ignored recent cases erasing class
distinctions for purposes of Fourth Amendment protection.
Part I of this Comment provides Carter's factual information. Part II
describes the historical development of Fourth Amendment cases leading
1. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990). Specifically, the Court held, "[the
defendant's] status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of
privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Olson, 495 U.S. at 96-97.
The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See generally State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, Minnesota v.
Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998) (stating "a closer reading of Olson reveals that the Supreme Court does
not require a person to establish his ... status as either a guest or overnight guest before... [he] can
prove a legitimate expectation of privacy .....
3. 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473 (emphasis added).
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up to Carter. Part I outlines the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions in Carter. Part IV critiques the Court's holding and the associated
rationale. Part V examines the outcomes of cases subsequent to Carter.
I. FACTS
Acting on information from a confidential informant, a police offi-
cer, James Thielen, walked by the window of a ground-level apartment
and observed the defendants, Carter and Johns, packaging white powder
into bags.6 Thielen stood twelve to eighteen inches away from the win-
dow and observed the defendants bagging the powder for approximately
fifteen minutes.7 The window's blinds were drawn, but a gap in the
blinds allowed Thielen to view the defendants' illicit activity.8 Thielen
contacted police headquarters to request a search warrant.9 Prior to exe-
cuting the warrant, however, the two defendants left the apartment in an
identified car.'0 Police stopped the car and noticed a black pouch and
handgun on the vehicle's floor." The officers arrested Carter and Johns,
and a subsequent police search of the vehicle revealed forty-seven grams
of cocaine in plastic sandwich bags.'2
Pursuant to a warrant, police also searched the apartment. There they
discovered cocaine residue and plastic bags similar to those found in the
Cadillac." The police later learned that the two defendants were not lessees
of the apartment, but lived in Chicago and visited the apartment solely to
package the cocaine." The defendants were inside for only approximately
two and one-half hours.'5 In exchange for use of the apartment, the defen-
dants gave the apartment's lessee a small amount of the cocaine.'6
Minnesota charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit a
controlled substance crime and aiding and abetting in a controlled sub-
stance crime." The defendants moved to suppress all evidence police
6. See id. at 471.
7. See id. at 480. The area just outside the apartment's window was "public" and frequently
used by families for walking and playing, making it easily accessible for anyone, including Officer
Thielen, to view the defendants from such a close distance. See id.
8. See id. at 471.
9. See id.
10. See id. The confidential informant had previously told Officer Thielen "that there was a
blue four-door Cadillac with Illinois license plates nearby that possibly belonged to the people in the
apartment." State v. Carter, 545 N.W.2d 695, 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 569 N.W.2d 169
(Minn. 1997), rev'd Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).





16. See id. at 471-72.
17. See id. at 472. MINN. STAT. § 152.021, subdivision 1 provides, "[a] person is guilty of
controlled substance crime in the first degree if ... on one or more occasions within a 90-day period
the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures of a total weight of ten grams or more containing
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obtained in the apartment and the car.'" They argued that Thielen's "initial
observation of their drug packaging activities was an unreasonable search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and. . . all evidence obtained as a
result [thereof] was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree."' 9
The Minnesota trial court held that the defendants were not entitled
to Fourth Amendment protection because they were not social guests
staying overnight, but were merely temporary, out-of-state visitors. 0 The
trial court also found Thielen's observations did not constitute a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' After trial each defen-
dant was convicted on both counts.2
The Minnesota Court of Appeals viewed defendant Carter's claim
that he was predominantly a social guest as "inconsistent with the only
evidence concerning his stay in the apartment, which indicate[d] ... he
used it for a business purpose-to package drugs. 123 Because the court
found business was the primary purpose of Carter's visit, it ruled he did not
have standing under the Fourth Amendment to object to Thielen's search.24
The Court of Appeals also affirmed defendant Johns' conviction.5
In a divided opinion the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed both
convictions and held that the defendants did have standing26 to claim
cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine ...." MINN. STAT.§ 152.021 (1999). The defendants were
also found to be in violation of section 609.05 of the Minnesota Statutes, which provides, "[a] person
is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires,
counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime." See Carter, 119 S.
Ct. at 472 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.05 (1999)).
18. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at472.
19. Id. See generally 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 677
(2d ed. 1982). The treatise notes:
If an unreasonable search has been made in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it is not
merely the material seized that cannot be admitted in evidence. The government may not
use the information thus improperly gained as a means of finding proper evidence. In
what the Court has rightly called "a time-worn metaphor," the government is said to be
barred from use of "a fruit of the poisonous tree."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
20. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472.
21. See id. The Fourth Amendment guarantees security against unreasonable searches and
seizures in "persons, houses, papers, and effects ...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472.
23. Id. (quoting State v. Carter, 545 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)). As support for
this proposition, the Minnesota Court of Appeals' only statement was, "[tihis [business purpose]
defeats the 'legitimate expectation of privacy' standard, which requires 'more than a subjective
expectation of not being discovered."' Carter, 545 N.W.2d at 698 (quoting Rakas v, Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
24. See Carter, 545 N.W.2d at 698.
25. See State v. Johns, No. C9-95-1765, 1996 WL 310305, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 11,
1996), rev'd, 569 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
26. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (stating that, "[t]o establish
'standing,' [c]ourts . . . have generally required that the movant claim either to have owned or
possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises
searched"), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). See generally Donald L.
Doernberg, The Right of the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the
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Fourth Amendment protection because they had a "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the apartment."27 The state court further held Thielen's
observations constituted a search of the apartment under the Fourth
Amendment and that the search was unreasonable.28
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures. ... ,29 Courts enforce this right by excluding from
trial evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3° However,
Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applies the general
principle that a party will not be heard to claim a constitutional protection
unless he "belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection
Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 263 (1983) (providing historical overview on the law of
standing under the Fourth Amendment).
27. State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d. 169, 176 (Minn. 1997) rev'd, Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct.
469 (1998); Johns, 569 N.W.2d at 181. The court supported this determination with facts showing
all three persons worked together to package the cocaine. The defendants remained inside for two
and one-half hours, and one defendant was even wearing bedroom slippers inside the apartment. See
Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 175. In addition, the court stated, "society does recognize as valuable the
right of property owners or leaseholders to invite persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct
a common task, be it legal or illegal activity." Id. at 176.
28. See id. at 176-79. In applying "curtilage" and "public vantage point" concepts to Officer
Thielen's search techniques, the court noted:
Several courts have agreed ... it is a search whenever police take extraordinary measures
to enable themselves to view the inside of a private structure .... [Elven if we concluded
... the area just outside the . . .apartment window was a common area, the fact that
Thielen left the sidewalk, walked across the grass, climbed over the bushes, placed his
face within 12 to 18 inches of the window and peered through a small gap between the
blinds makes it clear ... he took extraordinary measures to enable himself to view the
inside of a private dwelling.
Id. at 177-78 (footnotes omitted).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Matthew Frank, A Guest's Legitimate Expectation
of Privacy: A Case Analysis of Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990); 14 HAMLINE L. REV.
231, 240-46 (1990) (providing an overview of cases leading up to Minnesota v. Olson).
30. Cf McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1943) (stating, "a conviction in
the.., courts, the foundation of which is evidence obtained by disregard of liberties deemed
fundamental by the Constitution, cannot stand"). Excluding such evidence also deters improper
police procedure. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). In Mapp, the court stated, "[because]
the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is . . .constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.... to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its
enjoyment." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
1999] MINNESOTA V. CARTER
is given."3 Therefore, it must be understood that Fourth Amendment pro-
tection applies neither to every person, nor every search."
Jones v. United States33 was one of the first modem cases to con-
sider the relevant question of whether a person was in the class afforded
Fourth Amendment protection.3" The defendant in Jones was using a
friend's apartment when federal narcotics officers, who were executing a
search warrant, entered the apartment and found illegal drugs. 5 The de-
fendant was not the owner, nor the lessee of the apartment, but did have
the householder's permission to be there. 6 Defendant had a key, some
clothes inside the apartment, and had slept there for "maybe a night.
37
By virtue of the householder's consent to the defendant's presence
in the apartment, the Supreme Court concluded the defendant was "le-
gitimately on the premises."38 The Court rejected the government's ar-
gument that the defendant's association with the area searched was too
tenuous to confer standing because he was merely an invitee or guest.39
"Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee' and
'guest,' . . . ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ulti-
mately referable to constitutional safeguards."'  Jones thus established
that persons legitimately on the premises possessed Fourth Amendment
31. New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907). See also Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 260 (1960) (emphasizing that Rule 41(e) provides statutory direction in
"governing the suppression of evidence acquired in violation of the conditions validating a search"),
overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Frank, supra note 29, at 240
(emphasizing that the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is "only
available to those.., able to claim the protection of the ... amendment"). See generally FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(e).
32. See generally Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 474 (1998) (concluding it was
unnecessary to determine whether a search occurred because the defendants did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy to object to any search of the area entered); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,
335-36 (1990) (allowing police to conduct a warrantless search known as a protective sweep if they
have a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that.another person who might be
dangerous to officers may be present in the area); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03
(1974) (permitting a warrantless search of the items in an accused's possession, even if the search is
delayed until the accused arrives at the place of detention).
33. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
34. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 261.
35. See id. at 258-59.
36. See id. at 259.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 265. Specifically, the court stated, "anyone legitimately on premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be
used against him." Id. at 267.
39. See id. at 265-66. The government's prosecutors wanted to, draw distinctions between
classes, deeming those such as "guests" and "invitees" with only "use" of the premises as having too
"tenuous" an interest. Id. at 265. Further, although the government acknowledged temporary guests
do sometimes have "some measure of control," it argued that the defendant's short-term dominion of
the apartment should not be afforded the same protection as a person domiciled there. Id.
40. Id. at 266. See Frank, supra note 29, at 241 (utilizing the same rationale to illustrate the
Supreme court's refusal to use class distinctions based on property law concepts to establish Fourth
Amendment standing).
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standing." Jones erased the line of Fourth Amendment protection drawn
between the householder of a premises and the non-owner occupant or
visitor.42 Class distinctions were no longer relevant so long as the claim-
ant of Fourth Amendment protection was legitimately connected to the
invaded area.43
Jones' "legitimately on the premises" inquiry was replaced, how-
ever, when the Supreme Court focused on the individual's expectation of
privacy in the landmark case, Katz v. United States." In Katz, Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion proposed a widely followed two-prong rea-
sonableness test to determine whether a person is entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection. 5 "[F]irst ... a person [must] have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that . .. expecta-
tion [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'""
A determination of the standard of reasonableness requires "balanc[ing]
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental inter-
ests alleged to justify the intrusion." 7
Although curtilage and plain view issues surfaced in Katz,"5 the
Court emphasized that deciding whether a given area was "constitution-
ally protected" deflected attention from the real issue-whether the per-
son claiming Fourth Amendment protection had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the area searched. 9 Katz produced the now famous passage
41. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 266. Other case law suggested a person with a possessory interest in
the premises searched or the items seized also had Fourth Amendment standing. See, e.g., Combs v.
United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972) (holding, "[i]f [the defendant] can establish facts showing [a
possessory or proprietary] interest, he will have demonstrated a basis for standing to attack the
search ....").
42. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 266.
43. See id. at 267.
44. 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).
45. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (determining the reasonableness of the
warrantless seizure of a suspected drug-dealer's luggage for the purpose of detecting and
apprehending drug-traffickers).
48. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. In Katz, FBI agents placed electronic eavesdropping equipment
on the outside of a public telephone booth from which the defendant, a bookmaker, illegally
conducted his business. See id. See also Joel Schwartz, The Inadvertence Requirement of the Plain
View Doctrine in Horton v. California: A Foreseeable End?, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 225, 225-27 (1992)
(relying on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-69 (1971), "[t]he plain view doctrine
provides that the warrantless seizure of evidence [in plain view of] ... law enforcement officers does
not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the officers have a prior justification for the intrusion,
the article was immediatelyapparent as evidence of a crime, and the discovery of the evidence was
inadvertent").
49. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51. See also Frank, supra note 29, at 242 (noticing a trend in the
conclusions of the Supreme Court with respect to search and seizure cases; i.e., the Court began to
focus increasingly on whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy from government
intrusion as opposed to whether Fourth Amendment protection depended upon a property right or a
connection to the premises).
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by Justice Stewart, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."' This resulted in a narrowing of the protections afforded in
Jones;5 1 a person legitimately on the premises would not receive protec-
tion unless his expectation of privacy was deemed reasonable."
The Supreme Court expressly repudiated Jones' "legitimately on the
premises" test in Rakas v. Illinois.5 1 In Rakas, police stopped a car in
which the defendants were passengers.' The police suspected it was the
getaway car in a recent robbery." Officers searched the interior of the car
and found a sawed-off rifle and a box of shells.56 Before trial, the defen-
dants moved to suppress evidence of the seized rifle and shells. The trial
court denied the defendants' motion because neither the car, the shells, nor
the rifle belonged to them, and the defendants were eventually convicted. 8
The defendants advanced a "target" theory in their appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.59 They asserted "that any criminal defen-
dant at whom a search was 'directed' would have standing to contest the
legality of that search .... ."' Alternatively, defendants argued they were
"legitimately on the premises" at the time of the search and, therefore
had standing to object.' The Court rejected the target theory on the
premise that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights and may not
be asserted vicariously by those whose own Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated. 2 In addressing the "legitimately on the premises" ar-
gument, the Court stated it was "too broad a gauge for measurement of
50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
51. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (establishing "that anyone
legitimately on the premises ... may challenge [the] legality [of a search] "), overruled by United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
52. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court reiterated this
analysis in another case, holding the "capacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment
depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which
there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion." Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). See also Frank, supra note 29, at 242.
53. 439 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1978).




58. Id. at 131. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, concluding, "without a proprietary or
other similar interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to challenge the
legality of the search of the vehicle. Id.
59. See id. at 132-33. "Target standing would afford a defendant standing when he is the
subject of the investigation producing the search, notwithstanding that his property was not invaded
by the search, that he was not present when the search took place, and that his property was not
seized." Michelle Alexandria Curtis, Ninth Circuit Joint Venture Standing: A Joint Possessory
Interest is Sufficient to Establish Fourth Amendment Standing, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 311, 321 (1992).
60. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 133-34.
1999]
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Fourth Amendment rights."63 The Court articulated that a defendant could
attempt to exclude evidence derived from a search or seizure only if she
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' This le-
gitimate expectation of privacy test remains valid for determining
whether a person can object to alleged Fourth Amendment violations and
seek its exclusionary redress."
The class of persons considered to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy was subsequently expanded in O'Connor v. Ortega' and Minne-
sota v. Olson.' In O'Connor, officials of a public hospital suspected
work-related wrongdoing by Ortega, an employee-physician.68 As part of
an investigation, hospital officials searched the physician's office and
seized personal items as well as articles belonging to the state.' The
Court found Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk
and file cabinets as he had been the sole occupant of the office for sev-
enteen years, kept personal items in the desk and cabinets, and was not in
violation of any hospital regulation in doing so.7°
In Minnesota v. Olson, the Court decided that overnight guests have
a legitimate expectation of privacy.7' The defendant in Olson was a sus-
pect in the fatal shooting of a gas station manager." Upon receiving tips
on the defendant's whereabouts the morning after the murder, police
investigated a duplex where the defendant was thought to be staying.73
The owners of the duplex were not present at the time of the investiga-
tion.74 Without seeking permission, police entered the duplex and discov-
ered the defendant hiding in a closet.7" Within an hour of his arrest, the
defendant made an incriminating statement at police headquarters. 6
The United States Supreme Court held for the defendant and again
decided that the test to determine if a person has standing to challenge an
entr5 is whether that person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
63. Id. at 142. The Court added, "applied literally, this... permit[s] ... visitor[s] who ha[ve]
never seen, or been permitted to visit, the basement of another's house to object to a ... basement
[search] if the visitor[s] happened to be in the... [house's] kitchen... at the time of the search." lad
64. See id. at 148 (emphasis added).
65. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (reaffirming that "a defendant's
'standing' to contest an allegedly illegal search in favor of an inquiry... [focuses on whether] he or
she possessed a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' in the area searched").
66. 480 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1987).
67. 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990).
68. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 712.
69. See id. at 713-14. The seizure of the desk items prompted Ortega to bring suit, alleging the
search of his office violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 714.
.70. See id. at 718-19.
71. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 96.
72. See id. at 93.
73. See id. at 93-94.
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entered area." Although the discussion never addressed temporary
guests, it suggested they would receive the same privilege." Minnesota v.
Cartere rejected this suggestion.'
Also relevant to the analysis of Carter, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures applies to commercial premises as well as private
residences.8 ' In New York v. Burger,s" however, the Court emphasized
that "[a]n expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different
from, nd... less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home."
77. See id. at 99 (emphasis added). The state in Olson, in distinguishing its facts from those in
Jones, pointed out that the Olson defendant was never left alone in the duplex or provided a key with
which he could come and go and admit or exclude others. See id. at 98. The Court, however,
dismissed the state's dominion argument, supporting its decision with a lengthy discussion about
society's views on guest privacy:
That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the house is not inconsistent with
the guest having a legitimate expectation of privacy. The houseguest is there with the
permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his
guest .... The point is that hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests of
their guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact that
they have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal authority to
determine who may or may not enter the household.
Id. at 99.
The Olson Court added that an individual has a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the invaded
place if he has a subjective expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. See id. at 96-97; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (establishing the two-prong legitimate expectation of privacy test). This test, however,
should not be confused with the "legitimately on the premises" test applied in Jones. Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 259-67 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
The Jones test was much broader and focused almost exclusively on the defendant's connection to
the premises, i.e., whether he had dominion of the place, possession of a key, consent of the
householder, etc. See id.
78. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.3(b), at 137 (3d ed. 1996) (stating "[iut is fair to say that the Olson decision lends
considerable support to the claim that shorter-term guests also have standing").
79. 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
80. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473 (holding that the defendants, who were in another person's
apartment for a short time solely for the purpose of packaging cocaine, had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in the apartment).
81. See generally, See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967) (stating "the basic component of a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment-that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant
procedure-is applicable ... to business as well as to residential premises"); Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (noting "[the Fourth Amendment] is general and forbids
every search that is unreasonable; it protects all, those suspected or known to be offenders as well as
the innocent, and unquestionably extends to the premises where the search was made and the papers
taken").
82. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
83. Burger, 482 U.S. at 700. The defendant in Burger owned a junkyard and his business
consisted of dismantling automobiles and selling their parts. See id. at 693. Without notice, police
officers conducted an inspection pursuant to a New York vehicle and traffic statute. See id at 693-
94. After the inspection, the officers determined the defendant possessed stolen vehicles and parts.
See id. at 695. On appeal to suppress the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the denial of
defendant's motion was appropriate, emphasizing the expectation of privacy on commercial
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A. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion first dismissed the Minnesota
courts' analysis of whether the defendants had a legitimate expectation of
privacy under the rubric of the standing doctrine. ' The Supreme Court
reminded the litigants that determining whether a defendant is able to
show a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is "more properly
placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than
within that of standing."85 Thus, the Court implied the immediate issue
was whether the defendants could satisfy the two-prong reasonableness
test from Katz. 6
The Court did not analyze whether the search itself was valid, in-
stead, it decided the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the apartment." Therefore, the Court's analysis of the defen-
dants' classification as temporary social guests was driven by Katz's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test and the Court's interpretation of
the language in the Fourth Amendment.88
premises is less than a similar expectation in the individual's home, especially where, as here, the
business owner is working in a highly regulated industry. See id. at 700-02.
84. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472-73. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined
in the Court's opinion. See id. at 471. A concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas was filed by
Justice Scalia. See id. at 474. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 478. Justice
Breyer did not join in the Court's opinion, but did concur in judgment. See id. at 480. Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter dissented. See id. at 481.
85. See id. at 472 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)). This rationale
originated in Rakas:
[T]he question is whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained
during it. That inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and
seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect. We are under no illusion that by dispensing with the rubric of
standing used in Jones we have rendered any simpler the determination of whether the
proponent of a motion to suppress is entitled to contest the legality of a search and
seizure. But by frankly recognizing that this aspect of the analysis belongs more properly
under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of
standing, we think the decision of this issue will rest on sounder logical footing.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
86. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472. This inference was made from the Court's statement, "to
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has
an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable ...by
reference to ... understandings . .. recognized and permitted by society." Id. See generally Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing the now well-
recognized and followed two-prong reasonableness test).
87. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at474.
88. Id. at 472-73. Recall the language of the Fourth Amendment provides "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches ... 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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After laying the historical framework provided by Rakas,"9 the Court
reiterated, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places"; how-
ever, the extent to which people are protected may depend on their loca-
tion.' Given that the defendants were temporary guests at the apartment
building, analysis of Olson was essential.' The Court reprinted its
lengthy discussion from Olson about society's view on social guests and
reinforced Rakas' repudiation of the notion that "anyone legitimately on
the premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality."92 In light
of these two cases, the Court concluded that "an overnight guest in a
home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who
is merely present with the consent of the householder may not."9
The Court's rationale was partially based on the fact that defendants
"were essentially present for a business transaction... and were only in
the home a matter of hours."' The Court added, as opposed to the over-
night guest relationship in Olson, nothing in Carter indicated a "degree
of acceptance into the household."95 Although the apartment was a
dwelling for the lessee, the Court decided it was simply a place to do
business for the defendants. To justify the different and less favorable
treatment received in commercial premises as opposed to private resi-
dences, the Court relied on Burger." In discounting that the business
activity in this case took place inside "a home," the Court noted that it
was not "[the defendants'] home." The Court also distinguished the
circumstances in Carter from those in O'Connor, finding "there is no
indication that [defendants] in this case had nearly as significant a con-
nection to [lessee's] apartment as the worker in O'Connor.. ..""
Finally, the Court regarded the defendants in Carter as falling be-
tween the categories of the overnight guest, who may claim Fourth
Amendment protection, and one merely on the premises with consent,
who may not." In this case, the Court decided the defendants' situation
more closely resembled the latter because of the purely commercial na-
ture of the transaction, "the relatively short period of time [spent] on the
premises, and the lack of any previous connection between [defendants]
89. Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472 (referring to Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139-40).
90. Id. at 473 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
91. See id. at 473-74 (discussing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).




96. See id. at 474.
97. See id. (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1987)).
98. Id.
99. Id. See also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (reasoning that the defendant
occupied the office for seventeen years and kept materials in the office that included personal
materials with no connection to the hospital).
100. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 474.
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and the householder .... 1,01 For these reasons, the Court concluded that
the defendants' expectation of privacy in the apartment was not reason-
able, and therefore, it did not decide whether Thielen's observations con-
stituted a search.0 2
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia expressed his view that case law devoted too little at-
tention to the text and understanding of the Fourth Amendment." Spe-
cifically, Scalia pointed to the ambiguity of the "their... houses" phrase
in the Fourth Amendment text.'"0 He suggested the phrase could mean
Fourth Amendment protection extends to each person only in his own
house; or, each person would be protected even when visiting the house
of another. 5 With regard to Carter, however, Scalia argued it was not
plausible to give "their . . . houses" an expansive interpretation without
giving the same interpretation to "persons, papers, and effects."'"0 To do
this, however, would absurdly "give me a constitutional right not to have
your person unreasonably searched."'" Instead, Scalia asserted, "[t]he
obvious meaning of the provision is... each person has the right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures in his own person,
house, papers, and effects."'"° Therefore, because the Carter defendants
used the apartment solely to package cocaine, they could not successfully
assert that they were searched in "their ... hous[e]" under any plausible
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment."0
3. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion focused heavily on the in-
ability of a person to claim Fourth Amendment protection based on a
legitimate expectation of privacy when his connection to the dwelling-
101. Id.
102. See id. The Carter court dodged a bullet in this case; Fourth Amendment search issues are
often vague and controversial. Determining whether a search has occurred often turns on curtilage
and plain view issues. The plain view doctrine holds that "if, while lawfully engaged in an activity in
a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immediately,"
without first obtaining a search warrant. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983). "At common
law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life."' Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1985) (citing
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Curtilage is also defined as "any land or building
immediately adjacent to a dwelling .. " BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990).
103. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 474. (Scalia, J., concurring) "I write separately to express my
view that case law-like the submissions of the parties in this case-gives short shrift to the text of
the Fourth Amendment, and to the well and long understood meaning of that text." Id.
104. Id. "It must be acknowledged that the phrase 'their ... houses' in this provision is, in
isolation, ambiguous." Id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 474-75 (interpreting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
107. Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 477.
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place is insubstantial.' ° Kennedy, like the majority, emphasized that
Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and cannot be vicari-
ously bestowed upon a third party with no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the place searched."' Kennedy acknowledged that as a general
rule social guests should expect privacy in their host's home."'2 In his
view, however, the defendants "established nothing more than a fleeting
and insubstantial connection with [the] home.""' 3
4. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, strayed from the reason-
able expectation of privacy route taken by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Kennedy. Instead, he focused entirely on whether Officer Thielen's ob-
servations constituted a Fourth Amendment search."'4 Breyer agreed with
Justice Ginsburg's belief that the defendants deserved Fourth Amend-
ment protection.' In Breyer's view, however, the officer's observation
did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights."6 Breyer em-
phasized that the search was permissible because the officer's observa-
tions were made from a public vantage point."7 With regard to the steps
taken by the defendants to create a reasonable expectation of privacy
within the apartment, Breyer added, "[t]he precautions.., the apartment
dwellers took to maintain their privacy would have failed in respect to an
ordinary passerby standing in that place.""' 8 Finally, Breyer found it in-
significant that Officer Thielen made his observations from 12 to 18
110. See id. at 478-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. See id. at 479 (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219 (1981)); see also Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1978).
112. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 479 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Note that
Kennedy's opinion as to a guest's expectation does not appear to comport with the majority, which
held, "an overnight guest... may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is
present with the consent of the householder may not." Id. at 473.
113. Id.at479.
114. See id. at 480 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
115. Seeid. at480-81.
116. Id. at 480. "[The defendant] ... raises.. . [the] question whether... Thielen's observation
made 'from a public area outside the curtilage of the residence' violated [defendants'] Fourth
Amendment rights. In my view, it did not." Id. (citation omitted).
117. See id. In support of his position, Breyer noted, "[T]he apartment ...was a garden
apartment... partly below ground level;... families frequently used the grassy area just outside the
apartment's window for walking or for playing; ... members of the public also used the area.., to
store bicycles ..... Id.
118. Id. But see Commonwealth v. Panetti, 547 N.E.2d 46, 48 (1989)
It is one thing to assert that an occupant cannot claim a justified expectation of privacy as
to activities within his dwelling when that conduct is carried out in such a manner as to
be readily seen or heard by neighbors or by the passing public. It is quite another to
declare that citizens cannot 'feel safe in leaving their windows uncurtained to the skies'
or in otherwise failing to seal off each and every aperture in their dwellings ....
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.3(c), at 392 (2d ed. 1987)).
Viewed from this perspective, the Carter defendants were subjected to a Fourth
Amendment search. To argue otherwise would be to require homedwellers to seal every crack and
crevice to validly assert that a police search violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
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inches away by looking through gaps in the drawn blinds. "9 Instead, he
placed the burden of maintaining seclusion from the police upon the
apartment's occupants.' 20
5. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Writing a dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, Justice
Ginsburg stated that the majority's decision "undermines not only the
security of short-term guests, but also the security of the home resident
herself."'21 Ginsburg's position was that when householders personally
invite guests into their homes to engage in common endeavors, regard-
less of purpose, the guests should share their hosts' protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.'22 Ginsburg emphasized she was not
taking a position that would allow a casual visitor who has not been per-
mitted to visit a portion of her host's house to object to a search of that
unseen part of the house.'23 She was concerned, however, that a house-
holder who chooses "to share her home and company" with selected
people would be adversely affected.'2" "People have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in their homes in part because they have the prerogative
to exclude others.' 2 . "One reason we protect the legal right to exclude
others is to empower the owner to choose to share his home or other
property with his intimates."'2 6 Ginsburg added that under the majority
opinion, "[a] homedweller places her own privacy at risk" when she opens
119. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 481-82.
120. See id. at 481. But see State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Minn. 1997) (concluding the
investigating officer took extraordinary measures to make his observations by climbing over some
bushes located in front of the apartment's window, crouching down, and placing his face within
eighteen inches of the window). The court added, "[t]he fundamental question ... is whether the
looking intruded upon the justified expectation of privacy of the occupant. This . . . requires
consideration of two factors: (1) the location of the officer at the time of the viewing; and (2) the
precise manner in which the view was achieved." Id. This suggests a Fourth Amendment search
occurred. Justice Breyer, though factually correct in concluding that Thielen watched the defendants
from a public vantage point, failed to consider the extraordinary measures the officer took to make
his observations. With the exception of peeping toms, virtually no one peers through another's
apartment window from twelve to eighteen inches away through gaps in drawn blinds for fifteen
minutes at a time.
121. Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 481. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
122. See id.
123. See id. Ginsburg noted she "would not reach classroom hypotheticals like the milkman or
pizza deliverer," but rather only the case of the homeowner who chooses to share the privacy of her
home and company with a guest. Id. at 481-82.
124. Id. at 482. Specifically, Ginsburg stated, "[als I see it, people are not genuinely 'secure in
their.., houses ... against unreasonable searches and seizures' if their invitations to others increase
the risk of unwarranted governmental peering and prying into their dwelling places." Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1618 (1987)).
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her home to others, uncertain whether the duration of their stay, their pur-
pose, and their 'acceptance into the household' will earn protection.' 27
Ginsburg probed the court's logic in *Olson to argue that shorter-
term guests also merited Fourth Amendment protection.'" Olson stated,
"[w]e will all be hosts and we will all be guests many times in our lives.
From either perspective, we think . . . society recognizes that a house-
guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home."'29 Gins-
burg used this rationale in conjunction with Katz to argue "when a
homeowner chooses to share the privacy of her home and her company
with a short-term guest," the two-prong reasonableness requirement has
been satisfied.'30 Ginsburg also pointed out that the criminality of the
defendants' activities did not discard their right to Fourth Amendment
protection.'3' Therefore, "the illegality of host-guest conduct . . . would
not alter the [reasonableness] analysis" of the instant case. "2 Finally,
Ginsburg recognized the need to consider Fourth Amendment claims on a
case-by-case basis and that the Court's decision veered sharply from the path
marked in Katz, which she considered essential to her view of Carter."3
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Overnight v. Temporary Guest
Search and seizure cases have consistently emphasized, "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."'" 4 In light of Carter, however,
the Supreme Court has limited Fourth Amendment protection only to
those people in the proper "places" for the requisite amount of "time."
Recognizing that limitations on the Fourth Amendment are necessary
and prevent, among other things, frivolous claims for protection, the
127. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
128. See id.
129. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). Ginsburg built on this rationale, stating
"[v]isiting the home of a friend, relative, or business associate, whatever the time of day, 'serves
functions recognized as valuable by society."' Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 482 (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at
98).
130. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 482-83 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting). "Both host and guest 'have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy;' that 'expectation' [is] one [our] society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable."' Id. at 483 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967)).
131. See id. at 483; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1980) (emphasizing
"a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has
been committed and ... probable cause [exists to suggest] incriminating evidence will be found
within"); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1961) (suppressing evidence of
gambling offenses obtained by police who attached an electronic device to the heating duct of
defendant's house, turning the duct into a makeshift microphone running throughout the entire
house).
132. Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 483 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
133. Id. at 483-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating, "I do not agree that we have a more
reasonable expectation of privacy. .. [in] a public telephone booth ... than when we actually enter
[another's] premises to engage in a common endeavor").
134. Id. at 473 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
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majority stumbles over the rudimentary foundation of the Amendment.
By focusing heavily on the duration of a guest's stay, the Court ignored
the controlling question regarding the reasonableness of the temporary
guest's expectation of privacy in the residence searched-whether soci-
ety today is willing to recognize the temporary guest's expectation as
reasonable. Furthermore, the Court devoted too little attention to the na-
ture and legitimacy of the guest's activity as relative to him, his host, and
society during his stay.
The Court improperly applied Justice Harlan's two-factor reason-
ableness test in making its determination.'35 The first element, subjective
expectation of privacy, is clearly present. The defendants were inside the
apartment of an acquaintance with the door shut and the blinds drawn.'36
Moreover, they paid for the right to conduct their activity in what they
believed to be a private setting by giving part of their product to the les-
see in exchange for use of her apartment.'37 The Court's analysis faltered,
however, on the more difficult task of determining whether the second
prong of the test was met; i.e., whether society was prepared to recognize
the defendants' expectation as reasonable. In so doing, the Court distin-
guished between the overnight guest and the temporary visitor. It sup-
ported this position by engaging in a lengthy discussion about society's
views on the overnight stay and emphasizing our vulnerability when we
are asleep.'38
While our personal safety is certainly vulnerable when we sleep, this
rationale simply supports the belief that an expectation of privacy is rea-
sonable for an overnight guest. It is not dispositive on the issue of
whether society is prepared to recognize the same standard for a tempo-
rary guest. Indeed, assume the defendants and lessee in Carter consumed
some of their product, became tired, and fell asleep until the next morn-
ing. In light of Olson, the Carter defendants would receive Fourth
Amendment protection, merely because they became intoxicated to the
point where they stayed the night. Furthermore, a suspected drug dealer's
expectation of privacy in the home of another surely cannot be viewed as
less reasonable than the defendant's expectation in Olson.' 9
135. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting "there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable').
136. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.
Ct. 469 (1998).
137. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 471-72. Recall in exchange for use of the apartment, defendants
gave the lessee one-eighth of an ounce of the cocaine. See id.
138. See id. "It is for this reason [our vulnerability] that, although we may spend all day in
public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private place to sleep,
whether it be a hotel room, or the home of a friend." Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
99 (1990)).
139. See generally Olson, 495 U.S. at 93-94 (recalling the defendant was a murder suspect who
stayed overnight at a duplex to avoid police).
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The Court's perception that society believes the overnight guest has
a greater expectation of privacy than the temporary guest was one basis
for its holding.'" This, however, presumes that society considers the na-
ture of the activities occurring during the temporary guest's stay as less
important than those occurring during the overnight guest's stay. As-
suming the priority of the foregoing is true, such analysis still does not
answer the critical question-whether society deems the privacy expec-
tation of the temporary guest as reasonable. The Court merely declares
that society believes the overnight guest's privacy should be protected
from governmental intrusion."' That the temporary guest's expectation of
privacy is therefore generally illegitimate is unexplained and illogical.' 2
The Court could only speculate on whether society views the overnight
guest's expectation of privacy as more reasonable than the temporary
guest's. Even so, the speculation or true answer to that question is irrele-
vant.
Justice Ginsburg's suggestion that a case-by-case review is better
suited to determine society's acceptance or rejection of privacy expecta-
tions is correct because the nature of the temporary guest's activities
would be considered.' 4 As Ginsburg noted, the Court has drawn a "me-
chanical" line between the overnight and temporary guest.'" Of course,
the nature of the stay in Carter conferred little benefit on society, but
neither did the protected overnight stay in Olson.'5 Nor will all two-and-
one-half hour guests engage in Carter-like activities; some will be dinner
guests; some will be neighbors; others will be relatives. The point being,
many temporary guests will engage in activities just as, or more reason-
able and valuable to society as the overnight guest, yet these guests may
not enjoy Fourth Amendment protection.
The Court did place some credence on its belief that the defendants
possessed neither a relationship with the householder, "[n]or was there
anything similar to the overnight guest relationship in Olson to suggest a
degree of acceptance into the household.'"" Recall in Jones, however,
that the Court rejected arcane distinctions between guests, licensees, in-
vitees, and the like, noting that such distinctions "ought not to be deter-
140. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473. "To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the every day expectations of privacy that we all
share." Id. (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 98).
141. See id.
142. See id. With little explanation distinguishing the overnight and temporary guest, the Court
plainly held "an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but
one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not." Id.
143. See id. at 483 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Olson, 495 U.S. at 93-94 (emphasis added). Recall the defendant in Olson was suspected
of murder. See id. at 93.
146. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473.
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minative in fashioning . . . constitutional safeguards."'47 This is signifi-
cant because if courts do not distinguish between classes in determining
who is afforded Fourth Amendment protection, then the need for a de-
gree of acceptance by the householder is unnecessary. The more impor-
tant consideration would be whether the person had the householder's
permission to be there. Thus, Carter's emphasis on defendants' relation-
ship to the householder and the degree of acceptance extended to them is
not consistent with valid case law. Finally, the Court distinguished Car-
ter from O'Connor on the grounds that the Carter defendants did not
have a significant connection to the premises.' 8 However, guests likely
anticipate a greater degree of privacy in the home of a host than at public
or commercial place where members of the general public are typically
free to come and go without permission.' 9
B. The Business-Transaction Aspect
The Court classified the defendants' activity as a business-
transaction and relied on Burger to reinforce that an expectation of pri-
vacy on a "commercial premise" is less than a similar expectation in a
home.'5° An apartment or home is just that, however, and not a traditional
"commercial premise." Office buildings, restaurants, and department
stores are better examples of true commercial premises because their sole
function is to conduct business and earn profits. Even if the Court's ra-
tionale was, a home is "converted" to a commercial premise upon the
commencement of a business activity, it cannot be said it is no longer a
home.
In the century-old case of Boyd v. United States,'5' the Court stated,
"[tihe Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon
'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.""52 Today is a
time where the interrelationship between the home and business is sig-
nificant. The explosion of global technology allows for many people to
conduct their business affairs from home. Because a person engages in
business transactions from his home does not mean he does not use the
home for other intimate activities. The internet stock-trader, for example,
147. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980). While the "automatic standing" holding from Jones was overruled in
Salvucci, the Jones Court's view on class distinctions remains valid. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 135-36 (1978); see also Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-
32 (1959) (rejecting class distinctions as inappropriate to law of maritime torts).
148. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 474.
149. See id. at 474 (distinguishing from O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 711-19 (1987),
where a worker maintained the same office at a public health center for seventeen years and was
granted Fourth Amendment protection).
150. Id. at 474 (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,700(1987)).
151. 116 U.S. 646 (1886).
152. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 213 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Boyd,
116 U.S. at 630 (1886)).
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still cooks, uses the bathroom, sleeps, talks on the telephone, watches
television, eats dinner, and takes care of his family in his home. There-
fore, the Court's broad stance that commercial premises are afforded less
protection than residential areas for Fourth Amendment purposes lacked
caution and insight in evaluating the increasing uses of the private home.
Finally, Ginsburg's logic was on point in reasoning that the restric-
tion of the temporary guest's privacy also affects the householder's pri-
vacy interest.' 3 "One of the main rights [that] attach[es] to property is the
right to share its shelter, its comfort and its privacy, with others."'" The
householder cannot be genuinely secure in his home if he is "uncertain
whether the duration of [guests'] stay, their purpose, and their 'accep-
tance into the household' will earn [Fourth Amendment] protection."'' 5
Even though the householder is granted a higher level of protection than
the houseguest, he cannot be free from increased governmental "peering"
and "prying."'' 6 In short, there is no way to restrict the temporary guest's
expectation of privacy without also infringing upon the privacy of the
householder.
V. REACTION TO CARTER BY LOWER COURTS
Cases subsequent to Carter have consistently referred to it as the
most recent authority reaffirming the expectation of privacy test estab-
lished in Katz.' 5 Carter's failure, however, to clearly delineate what cir-
cumstances are required for a temporary guest to sometimes, if ever,
receive Fourth Amendment protection, has allowed courts to take oppo-
site analytical approaches to cases of a similar nature.' Not surprisingly,
therefore, the results of such cases, i.e., whether evidence obtained
should be suppressed at trial, have been conflicting.
153. See id. at 482 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Ginsburg added, "[a]
homedweller places her own privacy at risk . . . when she opens her home to others, uncertain
whether the [nature] of their stay ... will earn [Fourth Amendment] protection. Id.
154. Caner, 119 S. Ct. at 482 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
155. Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 482 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (endorsing Ginsburg's view that "people are not genuinely 'secure in their... houses.
against unreasonable searches and seizures' . . . if their invitations to others increase the risk of
unwarranted governmental peering and prying into their dwelling places") (citations omitted;
alterations in original).
157. See United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687 (1 lth Cir. 1999); United States v. Gordon, 168
F.3d 1222, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1999); Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178, 180-81 (D.C. Cir.
1999); United States v. Macias-Treviso, 42 F. Supp.2d 1206, 1211 (D. N.M. 1999); United States v.
Seyfried, No. 98-CV-830-FB, 1999 WL 14681, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1999).
158. Carter makes some distinction between the temporary and overnight guest, holding that:
"an overnight guest ... may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely
present with the consent of the householder may not." Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473. The Court, however,
raised the question whether in some instances temporary guests would be afforded protection by also
focusing on the defendants' short stay at the premises, the lack of a previous relationship, i.e.,
whether defendants had a legitimate 'connection' to the premises. See id. at 474.
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In United States v. Gordon,'9 police discovered drugs and ammuni-
tion in a warrantless search of a Kansas motel room.'" As in Carter, the
facts of Gordon established that the defendant had been in the motel
room for the purpose of "conducting business" only for a few hours prior
to the arrest.'6 ' The court first confirmed that an individual may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room.'62 Relying on Carter,
the court determined that the defendant's status was akin to that of a per-
son "simply permitted on the premises" for business purposes (distribut-
ing illegal drugs) rather than that of an "overnight guest."'' 3 The court
further concluded that the defendant's possession of the room key was
insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy."
In New Mexico, a federal district court also narrowly applied Carter
in the case of United States v. Macias-Treviso.' The defendant in Ma-
cias-Treviso was arrested for drug trafficking after a warrantless police
entry into a garage owned by his brother.'" The defendant moved to sup-
press all evidence which agents had obtained as a result of their warrant-
less (and thus allegedly unlawful) entry of the garage.'67 The defendant
asserted a legitimate expectation of privacy inside the garage because 1)
he had helped build his brother's house; 2) his brother had given him
permission to use the garage; 3) he had fixed cars in the garage; 4) he
had stored tools there for nearly a year; and 5) he was the only person
using a key to access the garage.'68
In light of Carter, the Macias-Treviso court rigidly concluded the
defendant was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.'69 The court
determined that although the defendant proved he had his brother's per-
mission to work on cars in the garage, he had not shown he had ever
159. 168 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1999).
160. See Gordon, 168 F.3d at 1224.
161. Id. at 1227. After being arrested and asked by a Detective what kind of business he was at
the motel room to conduct, the defendant responded with: "[w]ell, it's pretty obvious, isn't it." Id.
The room was registered to an acquaintance of the defendant, rather than the defendant. See id.
However, the defendant claimed because he possessed a key to the room, paid the registered room
occupant $30 to rent the room, and had clothing and toiletries in the room, he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it. See id.
162. See id. at 1226. (citing United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1991)).
163. Id. (quoting Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473).
164. See id. at 1226-27.
165. 42 F. Supp.2d 1206 (D. N.M. 1999).
166. Macias-Treviso, 42 F. Supp.2d at 1210-11. An air surveillance team followed the
defendant's vehicle to the garage because a confidential informant had given police information to
link the vehicle with illicit drug activity. See id. at 1208, 1210. Upon entering the garage,
government agents observed a large amount of cash scattered around the passenger side of the car
and two cell phones in the garage. See id. at 1211. Five hours after the agents had entered the garage,
they obtained a warrant to search the garage and the defendant's car, whereupon they found two
packages of cocaine in the trunk and a pager elsewhere in the car. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 1212.
169. See id.
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been an overnight guest in the home or garage. The court used Carter
as authority for the proposition that commercial property is afforded a
lower level of Fourth Amendment protection than residential property.
7
1
Appellate courts in United States v. Chaves7 2 and Morton v. United
States7 1 took a more expansive reading of Carter. In Chaves, Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) agents seized cocaine from a van and
broke into a warehouse without first obtaining a search warrant." The
defendants, convicted after a trial, appealed on the grounds that the war-
rantless search of the van and entry into the warehouse had violated their
Fourth Amendment rights; consequently, they argued that their motions
to suppress evidence of the cocaine seized should have been granted . 5
In a decision for the defendants, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "[a]s
the Supreme Court has recognized .... even where a defendant does not
own the property searched, he .. .may nonetheless have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that place by virtue of his ... relationship with
that place."' 6 The court then directed its focus to Justice Kennedy's con-
curring Carter opinion, which stated, "almost all social guests have a
legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence protection against unreason-
able searches, in their host's home ... .'" Although the defendant nei-
170. See id.
171. See id. "[A] person's expectation of privacy in commercial premises is less than an
expectation of privacy in his or her home." Id. (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469, 474
(1999)).
172. 169F.3d687(llthCir. 1999).
173. 734 A.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
174. See Chaves, 169 F.3d at 689. A DEA surveillance team, acting on an informant's tip,
followed a defendant to a warehouse and later to a restaurant. See id. While this defendant was in the
restaurant, a DEA agent approached the van the defendant had been driving and observed several
boxes that had not been there before. See id. DEA agents then arrested the defendant and searched
the van, seizing several boxes of cocaine, money, and keys belonging to the defendant. See id.
Shortly thereafter the agents arrested two other persons at the warehouse and broke into the
warehouse, where they observed boxes similar to those discovered in the van. See id. Relying on this
information, the agents obtained a search warrant and found about 400 kilograms of cocaine in the
boxes in the warehouse. See id.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 690 (citing Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 474). The court added, "[a]s Carter teaches, 'in
order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he
personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable
."' Id. (quoting Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472).
177. Id. (quoting Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 478-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). But see Carter, 119
S. Ct. at 474-75. The dilemma presented by Kennedy's statements is whether they conflict or
comport with the majority's opinion. The majority bluntly held that an overnight guest is entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection, but the mere temporary guest is not. See id. at 474. The Carter
majority's analysis of defendants' connection to the premises may bolster Kennedy's analysis; i.e.,
in some instances, depending on their connection to the place searched, temporary guests may be
afforded protection. The majority, however, did not provide even one example of when such a
situation might arise and any reference thereto is plainly absent in its one-sentence holding. Hence,
the black-letter law of Carter seems open to interpretation. Further, note the Chaves court refers to
Justice Kennedy's concurrence for guidance on the connection to the premises issue, and not to the
majority opinion. Chaves, 169 F.3d at 690 (emphasis added).
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ther owned, nor formally rented the warehouse, the court decided his
connection to the warehouse sufficiently established a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.
Justice Kennedy's Carter concurrence played an even greater role in
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' review of Morton.'79 In that
case, an undercover officer bought two bags of cocaine from the defen-
dant who then walked to a nearby house.'8" Without a warrant, the arrest
team knocked on the door of a house, immediately entered, seized the
defendant, and removed him from the home.' No one consented to the
officers' entry; nor did the prosecution argue that hot pursuit or exigent
circumstances doctrine rendered the warrantless entry lawful.' Although
the defendant did not reside at the house, the owner declared at the sup-
pression hearing that the defendant was there by invitation and fre-
quented the house "[1]ike family."'8 3 The court found the defendant had
achieved "a degree of acceptance into the household" and, therefore,
warranted Fourth Amendment protection." The court rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that "Carter [had] little to say about what showing
of a privacy interest must be made by a guest who does not enjoy the
178. See Chaves, 169 F.3d at 690. The court noted that the defendant seemed to have had the
sole key to the warehouse, and also that he kept some personal and business papers there. See id. at
691. The court found that these circumstances demonstrated the defendant was not merely a guest or
invitee, but was much closer to the kind of person who could be said to be maintaining custody and
control of the premises. See id. at 691 (comparing favorably the facts of this case with those in
Jones). Note, though, this rationale is in fundamental conflict with valid case law that previously
erased the distinction between classes.
179. See 734 A.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
180. See Morton, 734 A.2d at 179. The arrest team apprehended the defendant five minutes
after he had sold the two bags of cocaine to an undercover officer. Id. at 180.
181. See id.
182. See id. Exigent circumstances sometimes justify dispensing the search warrant
requirement for conducting a search. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (allowing
warrantless search to prevent destruction of evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99
(1967) (permitting warrantless searches if warrant would gravely endanger police officers' lives);
United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 611 (D. D.C. 1973) (holding the arrest of a hotel guest in
possession of narcotics invalid because there was no need for immediate action-the court
contrasted such circumstances from more dangerous ones, such as when someone possesses a
sawed-off shotgun); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (Cal. 1972) (permitting warrantless
searches in cases of political assassinations).
183. Morton, 734 A.2d at 180.
184. Id. at 182 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct. 469, 473 (1999)). Though the defendant
had no ownership interest in the home and lived elsewhere, at the time of his arrest he was there by
invitation and frequented the residence like a member of the family. See id. at 180, 182. The court
found this sufficient to establish a degree of acceptance into the household such that that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. at 182. In reaching this conclusion, the
court discounted the government's assertion that there was no evidence defendant ever spent the
night at the home, had a key to the home, was permitted to come and go at his leisure, or that he
remained in the home for any length of time when he visited. See id. at 180.
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status of overnight guest.""' In light of Kennedy's analysis, the court
considered itself free to read Carter in a less restrictive fashion.'"
The contrasting outcomes of the foregoing cases exhibit the ambi-
guities of Carter. Little factual support exists to suggest the defendants in
Chaves and Morton were more connected to the premises than the defen-
dant in Macias-Treviso. The Macias-Treviso defendant, in fact, was not
simply "like family" in relation to the householder as was the situation in
Morton; he was family.' As in Chaves, the defendants in both Macias-
Treviso and Gordon were in possession of keys and had personal be-
longings in the places searched.'88 Tit-for-tat comparisons may help to
distinguish the factual bases of each case, but the widely divergent re-
sults suggest the Carter Court's true intentions are less than obvious.
Carter is ambiguous because the Court did not clearly specify what
roles, if any, connection to the premises, acceptance into household, du-
ration of stay, or purpose of the visit play in deciding whether a guest is
afforded Fourth Amendment protection. Carter's majority considered
factors besides whether one was an overnight guest. Otherwise, the de-
gree of acceptance comparison to Olson was unnecessary.'" Furthermore,
it would not have been necessary for the Court to elaborate on the com-
mercial aspects of the defendants' stay. '" Carter, however, provided
little direction by way of examples or other verbiage to indicate what
weight should be assigned to which factors in granting Fourth Amend-
185. Id. at 181. "The [government's] suggestion, in other words, is that Carter leaves
undisturbed... prior decisions requiring what might be termed proof of Olson-equivalent status-
facts such as possession of a key, a demonstrated pattern of coming and going, keeping clothes on
the premises, and the like--before a guest may acquire the protected privacy interest of the owner."
Id.
186. See id. The Morton court stated:
Mhe opinion of a fifth justice whose vote was decisive obviously must be taken
seriously. Justice Kennedy . .. joined the majority only because its opinion was
consistent with his "view that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of
privacy." If anything, [Kennedy] appeared to be of the view that only someone
approximating the non-guest status the state Supreme Court had assigned the Carter
defendants-who had "nothing more than a fleeting and insubstantial connection" to the
home, . . . -- could be denied Fourth Amendment protection. Nothing in Justice
Kennedy's analysis suggests he would require an Olson-equivalent showing before a
defendant may assert Fourth Amendment rights in a dwelling into which he has been
invited. Our attempt to read the "tea leaves" of how the Supreme Court would decide this
case must be guided by... [Kennedy's] recognition.
Ld. at 181-82. (citations omitted) (quoting Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 473-79).
187. Id. at 180. The witness in Morton described the frequency of defendant's visits as being
"[I]ike family." Id. The defendant in Macias-Teviso, on the other hand, was the actual brother of the
premises owner. See United States v. Macias-Teviso, 42 F. Supp.2d 1206, 1210 (D. N.M. 1999).
188. See Macias-Teviso, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1212; United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1226
(10th Cir. 1999). Both Gordon and Macias-Treviso serve as legitimate examples of narrow Carter
interpretations. The Macias-Treviso defendant case presents a more questionable outcome than
Gordon, based on Macias-Treviso's more continuous connection to the premises.
189. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at473-74.
190. See id. at 474 (emphasis added).
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ment protection.'9 ' For this reason, courts following Carter have taken
the liberty of putting their own spin on what Carter really means, relying
heavily on Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion for some semblance of
black and white guidance.'92
CONCLUSION
In Minnesota v. Carter, the Supreme Court held that a temporary
guest, merely with consent of the householder, may not claim Fourth
Amendment protection.'93 In reaching this result, the Court improperly
applied the two-prong Katz test. The Court's analysis distinguished the
differences between the overnight guest and the temporary guest. The
analysis did not, however, fully scrutinize the value society places on the
ability to invite guests into the sanctity of one's home on a short-term
basis, regardless of the visit's purpose. The Court implied that society
recognizes the overnight guest's expectation of privacy as reasonable,
and because the temporary guest's expectation is somehow less valued
by society, it was deemed unreasonable. The majority's opinion lacks
any critical inquiry as to society's current views on the nature and social
value of the temporary guest's stay. Moreover, the Court's claim that the
defendants lacked acceptance into the household ignored evolving case
law that had erased class distinctions concerning proprietary interests and
sought only to determine whether the guest was granted permission from
the householder to be on the premises.
The Court did not properly apply prior case law related to business-
transaction protection. Carter damaged the sanctity of the home by rul-
ing that a home used for business-transactions is treated like a commer-
cial premise for Fourth Amendment purposes, thereby reducing the
householder's protective status. This is particularly disconcerting in an
age where the relationship between the home and business is so inter-
twined. The Court further failed to distinguish between transactions con-
ducted on traditional commercial premises and those transactions con-
ducted in the private home used for business. The majority opinion never
addressed the limiting effects of its ruling on an actual householder's
privacy interest within his home that will result from the Court's refusal
to extend Fourth Amendment protection to temporary guests and busi-
ness activities carried on inside that home.
Finally, the absence of a definitive ruling or even helpful illustra-
tions outlining what exactly is required for temporary guests to receive
191. See id. at 473. This analysis should be considered separately from the author's core
position that Carter fails in its conclusion that society recognizes the overnight guest's expectation
of privacy as more reasonable than that of the temporary guest.
192. Justice Kennedy was the only member of the Court to explicitly state: "as a general rule,
social guests will have an expectation of privacy in their host's home." Id. at 479; see id. at 474-75
(interpreting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
193. Id. at 473.
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Fourth Amendment protection has produced a stream of divergent results
among district and circuit courts. Perhaps the ambiguities in Carter stem
from the lack of a true consensus among the different Justices. Justice
Kennedy's position is clear: temporary guests should merit Fourth
Amendment protection in most instances. The majority position, how-
ever, is less concrete. If the Carter rule continues to produce arbitrary
results among lower courts, perhaps the Supreme Court will be forced to
develop a test that delivers greater uniformity and predictability. Until
then, we can expect more inconsistent results.
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